Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 61 | Issue 4

Article 4

4-1-1995

ESSAY: Virgina is not Safe for "Lovers": The
Virginia Supreme Court Rejects Tarasoff in Nasser v.
Parker
Peter Lake

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
Recommended Citation
Peter Lake, ESSAY: Virgina is not Safe for "Lovers": The Virginia Supreme Court Rejects Tarasoff in Nasser v. Parker, 61 Brook. L. Rev. 1285
(1995).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol61/iss4/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law Review
by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

ESSAY

VIRGINIA IS NOT SAFE FOR "LOVERS": THE
VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT REJECTS TARASOFF
IN NASSER V. PARKER
PeterLaket
The right of a mental-health-care professional to remain
deliberately indifferent to the imminent peril of a woman
specifically known to be endangered by a patient who is a mad
"lover" with a demonstrated history of extreme violence won a
resounding victory recently in the Supreme Court of Virginia
in Nasser v. Parker.' Nasser held that a psychotherapist has
no duty to warn a woman that his patient, who has threatened
to kill her, has left institutionalization even when the woman
acts detrimentally upon reliance that the dangerous man is
being treated institutionally for his mental disorder.' This
case represents the first time any court of last resort3 has
* @1995 Peter Lake. All Rights Reserved.
t Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law; B-, (1981), Harvard

College, JD., (1984), Harvard Law School. The author would like to dedicate

this

essay to TI'. and to others who similarly have given so much that others might
learn from their sacrifices.
2 455 S.E.2d 502, 506 (Va. 1995).
2 See infra notes 11-26 and accompanying text.
The only other court to date that has rejected Tarasoff v. Regents of the
University of California is an intermediate court of appeals in Florida. Boynton v.
Burglass, 590 So. 2d 446 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). See generally Andrew C.
Greenberg, Note, FloridaRejects a Tarasoff Duty to Protec, 22 STM0N L. REV.
239 (1992). Florida's Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, but Florida has
adopted legislation which permits psychotherapists to warn under appropriate
circumstances. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 455.2415 (West 1989 & Supp. 1995).
Depending on how one counts, about half of the states have adopted or indicated
that they would adopt some type of Tarasoff duty to warn, whather judicially or
legislatively, or both. See Bradley v. Ray 904 S.W.2d 302 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995),
reh'g denied (Aug. 1, 1995) (engaging in an excellent discussion of the state of
1285

1286

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61: 1285

squarely rejected the seminal decision of Tarasoff v. Regents
of the University of California'which held that
[O]nce a therapist does in fact determine, or under applicable
professional standards reasonably should have determined, that a
patient poses a serious danger of violence to others, [the therapist]
bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the foreseeable
victim of that danger.'

Until now, other jurisdictions had gone in exactly the opposite
direction of Nasser.7 The real debate about Tarasoff duties had
revolved around how to extend or tailor the above holding.'
Although Nasser is an aberration--destined for use in torts
casebooks as counterpoint to Tarasoff and doomed to condemnation--its reliance upon the Restatement (Second) of Torts
could bait other courts into following its flawed analysis.
The facts of Nasser, as alleged,"0 hardly cry out for no imposition of duty. The murder victim, Angela Nasser Lemon had a
"relationship"" with George Edwards. When she sought to
terminate the relationship, Edwards held a gun to her head

Tarasoff duties in the United States). If one were revisiting the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, Topic 7 (affirmative duties), one would now have to recognize a
general consensus upon at least the idea that a psychotherapist has a duty to
warn a readily identifiable potential victim when a patient communicates a serious
threat of physical violence against that person. Bradley, 904 S.W.2d at 306-07.
" Ironically, the Nasser court suggested that that case was distinguishable
from Tarasoff. Nasser, 455 S.E.2d at 504. However, even if Tarasoff were not
factually distinguishable, see infra note 28, the Nasser court found the Tarasoff
decision "unpersuasive." Id. at 504.
551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
6 Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 345. See also Peter F. Lake, Revisiting Tarasoff, 58
ALB. L. REV. 97 (1994).
See supra note 3.
s See Lake, supra note 6 at 97-102.
Nasser is a survival of tough-sounding, no-affirmative-duty-to-aid cases that
have found little support in modern times. See Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d
159 (Wis. 1988); Mostert v. CBL & Assoc., 741 P.2d 1090 (Wyo. 1987); Farwell v.
Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217 (Mich. 1976). Cf. Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343 (Pa.
1959). Even the now dated Restatement (Second) of Torts analyzed the old no-duty
to-rescue cases and anticipated their eventual demise. SEE RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF ToRTS § 314 cmt. (c) and § 314A, Caveat and cmt. (b) (1977). Nasser is a mod.
ern day Yania v. Bigan, and a throwback to a no.duty-to-aid era. See Warren
Seavey, I Am Not My Guest's Keeper, 13 VAND. L. REV. 699 (1960).
" Plaintiffs complaint was dismissed on demurrer in Nasser. 455 S.2d at
502.
U Nasser, 455 SZE.2d at 502.
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and "threatened to kill her."' He had done this type of thing
before.'3 Lemon sought a warrant for Edwards's arrest, 4 but
chose to leave her home and went into hiding to protect herself. 5 Edwards then visited Dr. Charles E. Parker, a licensed
psychiatrist, who had treated Edwards for seventeen years for
his mental problems. 6 Dr. Parker had full knowledge of the
situation: he knew of Edwards's general problem with women,
and of the specific recent threat against Lemon." Dr. Parker
arrived at a conclusion: "Edwards' mental condition was deteriorating and... [he] needed prolonged intense therapy in a
mental hospital." 8 Edwards was admitted to Peninsula Psychiatric Hospital, albeit and inexplicably "on a voluntary
basis,"'9 and into a non-secure section of the hospital.'
Lemon learned that Edwards was hospitalized,2 ' and, believing that Dr. Parker "had arranged for Edwards to be hospitalized for a prolonged period," she went home. Edwards left
the hospital within approximately twenty-four hours, but revisited Dr. Parker for medication. Just a few days later, Edwards went to Lemon's home, killed her, and then himself.2
The tragedy might have been avoided with a letter or a simple
telephone call from either Dr. Parker or the hospital; that call
was never made, nor was Lemon given any notification of
Edwards's departure from the hospital.'
Minor differences aside, Nasser's facts are at least on all
fours2 with those of Tarasoff. In Tarasoff, a patient told a

'2

Id. at 502-03.

Id. at 503.
1,Id. at 503. Curiously, Nasser does not consider any further encounters Ed"

wards may have had with the police and the legal system.
x'Id. at 503.
Nasser, 455 S.,.2d at 503.
17TId.

Id. (emphasis added).
"Id.
"

Id.

21 Nasser, 455 SE.2d at 503. The Court did not discuss how Lemon learned

that Edwards was hospitalized, who told her, or what she reasonably understood
Edwards's status in the hospital to be. Because the matter was dismissea on the
pleadings, Nasser does not give us the benefit of many important fads.
2
23
2A

Id- at 503.
Id.
Id.

2Id.
2

The Nasser court asserts that Tarasoff is "factually distinguishable,' but does
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psychotherapist at the University of California that he intended to kill his estranged 'love" interest.' As a result, he was
detained by campus police who quickly released him; the
psychotherapist's superior ordered that no further attempt be
made to detain himY No one was warned. 29 The former patient then went to the victim's apartment and killed her.
Change the names, dates, places, and slightly alter the sequence of events, and Nasser virtually is Tarasoff on its facts:
another insane-killer-lover" case. Since the mid-1970's when
Tarasoffwas decided, American jurisdictions have consistently
found at least some duty to warn or protect persons endangered by psychotherapists' dangerous patients,31 especially in
this context.
In lieu of putting the problem in its proper societal perspective, and deftly ignoring the weight of authority and the
virtual dearth of support for its holding in other jurisdictions, 2 Nasser chose to hide behind a technical-and technically inaccurate and incomplete-analysis of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.' Nasser put great emphasis upon being

not explain its conclusion. Nasser, 455 S.E.2d at 504. One might distinguish the
case on the ground that the campus police did briefly detain the future murderer
in Tarasoff. This action might raise an inference that someone "took charge" of the
killer (Tarasoff did not raise such an inference). Even so, Nasser mistakenly
equates taking charge with taking custody (see infra note 46), and the killer in
Tarasoff was not taken into custody when being detained by campus security.
Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 339.
2

2

Id.

at 339-340.

Id. at 340.

3' Id. at 339.
31 See supra note 3.

Nasser only recognized the weight of authority around the country through
the mouth of the plaintiffs lawyer, stating, "The plaintiff says that Tarasoff...
is ... recognized as the foremost authority on the duty of a mental health professional to warn a known victim of the danger presented to him or her from the
professional's patient." Nasser, 455 S.E.2d at 504. Plaintiffs lawyer is right. See
Bradley v. Ray, 505 S.W.2d 302, 306-07 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
' Nasser, 455 SE.2d at 504. Nasser illustrates the jurisprudential pitfalls of
semi-authoritative documents like a Restatement. Particularly in the area of affirmative duties, the Restatement (Second) of Torts is easy to characterize in overly
simplistic (and incorrect) ways, and its obtuseness often baits courts to do something that distracts them from common law analytical reasoning. See Lake, supra
note 6. There is also something peculiarly dangerous about adopting one section
from a Restatement topic while ignoring other sections when the sections were intended to be read together. See Nasser, 455 S.E.2d 504 (determining that Sections
316-318 were inapplicable).
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faithful to that Restatement, but like Edwards, was willing
to sacrifice the thing adored for the sake of misguided affection.
The Nasser court began its analysis by rejecting Tarasoff,
stating, "we find the decision unpersuasive [because] it is at
odds with the Court's interpretation of the Restatements provisions relating to one's duty to control the conduct of a third
party.'e The court focused its attention upon Restatement
(Second) of Torts, section 319 and its link to section 315 of that
Restatement.' Section 315, which the Restatement (Second) of
Torts considers to be a "special application of the general [limited no-duty] rule stated in section 314," provides as follows:
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to
prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person
which imposes a duty which the actor to control the third person's
conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the
other which gives to the other a right to protection."

Nasser involves a section 315 (a) question because it relates to
special relationships between a psychotherapist and a patient
(the "actor" and "third persone), and for which the Restatement (Second) provides a specific list of special relationships in
sections 316-319."9 Nasser thus turned to section 319 for guidance.4 °

Nasser, 455 S.,.2d at 506.
SId. at 504.

Id. at 504-05. The court correctly eliminated Restatement (Sccond) of Torts
§ 316 (parent/child duties), § 317 (master/servant duties) and § 318 (po'essor of
land or chattel/licensee duty) from consideration. RESTATEMENTP (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 316-318 (1977).
' Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 315 cmt. a. Section 314 provides:
The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to
take such action. Id. at § 314 (emphasis added). Restatement (Second) of Torts §
314 does not state, as is sometimes believed, that there generally is no affirmative
duty to aid or protect.

' Nasser, 455 S.E.2d at 504. However, some courts are not averse to considering that the family of a patient is in a special relationship with the doctor as
well. See, e.g. Hoffman v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752, 753 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1970) (recognizing a physician's duty to family members of a patient once a contagious disease is known to exist), appeal denied, 245 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1971).
RESTATFMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS, § 315 cmt. (c) (1977).
Nasser, 455 S.B.2d at 504. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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Section 319 provides for a certain type of special relation-

ship:
One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should
know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is
under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person
to prevent him from doing such harm.41

The application of section 319 presents some tricky problems.42 For example, the Restatement chose the "takes charge
of' formulation in lieu of a "takes control of" or a "taken custody of"s formulation. Nasser brushed past such distinctions
and effectively ruled that in order to take charge of someone
within the meaning of section 319, one must actually assert
custody or control over that person. 4

4, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (emphasis added).

See Lake, supra note 6, at 130-152.
See Lake, supra note 6, at 130-52.
Nasser, 445 S.E.2d at 506. After reviewing two earlier cases, Fox v. Custis,
372 S.E.2d 373 (Va. 1988) (holding there is no duty and no § 315(a) special relationship between a parole officer and a parolee), and Dudley v. Offender Aid and
Restoration of Richmond, Inc., 401 SZE.2d 878 (Va. 1991) (holding there is a duty
and § 315(a) special relationship between half-way house and prisoner), the court
ambiguously concluded:
Accordingly, we disagree with the holding of Tarasoff that a doctor-patient relationship or a hospital-patient relationship alone is sufficient, as
a matter of law, to establish a "special relation" under Restatement §
315(a). Within the context of the Restatement [meaning § 315(a) not §
315(b); otherwise clearly false], there is nothing special about the ordinary doctor-patient relationship or hospital-patient relationship. We think
there must be added to those ordinary relationships the factor, required
by § 319, of taking charge of the patient, meaning that the doctor or
hospital must be vested with a higher degree of control over the patient
than exists in an ordinary doctor-patient or hospital-patient relationship
before a duty arises concerning the patient's conduct.
Nasser, 455 S.E.2d at 506.
That conclusion would be ambiguous without specifying what the ordinary relationship looks like. However, as if to slam the door, the 'Virginia Supreme Court apparently clarified this point in response to plaintiffs argument that only a minimal duty was owed:
The plaintiff argues, however, that while a higher degree of control might
be appropriate when an effort is made to impose upon a doctor or hospital a duty to confine the third person, such degree of control is inappropriate "when the sole question is whether there existed a duty to warn a
known potential victim of the danger (posed] by the at large patient." In
the latter situation, the plaintiff opines, "the necessary amount of control
is minimal," and he requests that we apply the minimal degree standard
in this case and reverse and vacate the trial court's order sustaining the
defendants' demurrers.
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There are several problems with Nasser's Restatement
(Second) of Torts analysis, one inherent in section 319, with
the others arising from other sections. Ironically, the Restatement (Second) of Torts favors liability for several reasons other
than section 319 reasons. First, Nasser is problematic under
section 319 because it equates "taking charge" with taking
"control" and with having "custody." There is some reason to
believe that the Restatement intends for these different terms
to be treated equally, 5 but the rule stated in section 319 is
"noticeably broader" than the illustrations which accompany
the section. 6 There is plenty of room in section 319 for
growth if taking charge of someone is possible even when one
does not have control or custody of that individual.
Nasser may very well be that case. In Nasser, Dr. Parker
may well have had the power to exert control over Edwards, or
to have others exert control over or take custody of him.'
Nasser leaves open many questions-should not Dr. Parker
have tried to secure Edwards's presence in the hospital
through involuntary commitment or nonrevocable voluntary
commitment. 4 9 Should not Dr. Parker have taken appropriate

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 1438 (1986), we deny
the plaintiffs request. To grant the request would be to render all but
meaningless the "takes charge" language of Restatement § 319. That language imports much more than a minimal degree of control, conveying,
instead, the notion, as pertinent in the health care context and applicable
to both a duty to confine and a duty to warn, that to take charge of a
patient means, paraphrasing Fox; to "assert custody in the sense that the
[patient] is in the personal care and control of the [doctor or hospital]."
Nasser, 455 SB.2d at 506 (citation omitted).
' See Lake, supra note 6, at 130 and nn. 191, 192, 193.
" See Lake, supra note 6, at 130 and n.191.
' See Lake, supra note 6, at 130 and n.190.
•s Nasser's factual recitation does not disclose whether or not Dr. Parker could

have involuntarily committed or otherwise controlled or secured Edwards, or
whether or not Dr. Parker might have called the police and caused Edwards to be
taken into legal custody. It would not be unusual for an individual charged with
assault who had a prior record to return to custody to explain specific threats
made against a prior victim. At the very least, in many Naecer.liho cases there
would be the opportunity to exert control Although neither illustration to § 319
answers the question, it seems that in light of those illustrations, if a patient is
admitted to a hospital suffering pains (and at that point is not secured) and it
turns out that she has the deadly Ebola virus, a doctor who failed to quarantine
that patient (if reasonably able to do so) or take other reasonable action for the
protection of others must do so under § 319.

"See

RESTATMEFMNT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 120, 120A (1977) (diztinguishing
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and reasonable steps to attempt to have the law enforcement
system control Edwards's behavior, either by incarcerating
him, or by controlling his access to Lemon or her home?" Section 319 is consistent with affirmative responses to these questions because taking charge can occur even when one does not
have control or custody.
Nasser attempts to sidestep problems with its section 319
reasoning by pointing out, correctly, that Tarasoff does not cite
section 319,"' and is a weak section 319 case at best. 2 In
Tarasoff, it is not clear whether the therapists took charge of
the dangerous patient in any significant sense at all: the patient in Tarasoff confided his dangerous intentions to a psychologist (not a psychiatrist) in an out-patient setting. 3 Moreover, the therapists in Tarasoff may have chosen not to take
charge of the patient, even if they were in a position to do so if
necessary.' That Tarasoff is a weak section 319 case does not
mean that Nasser is weak, or as weak. Nasser differs in a proliability way because a licensed physician arguably took charge
of Edwards by putting him in a hospital setting, a setting
where presumably it was at least possible to secure his presence. Ironically, if Nasser is distinguishable from Tarasoff,it is
distinguishable in that it may actually be the stronger case for
the imposition of a duty to warn.

privilege to detain from privilege to arrest).
' One way to control Edwards's behavior would have been to remove his ac-

cess to certain avenues of behavior. Control does not always imply complete restraint or imprisonment but can involve limiting access to one or another avenue
of opportunity. Hence "crowd" control is a meaningful notion even outside of concentration camps or prisons. Dr. Parker had such control. By warning Lemon he
would have had an effective way to control his patient's violent behavior. Nasser
misses the nuances of control and the subtleties of power.
61 Tarasoff is difficult to reconcile with the Restatement (Second) of Torts because it sidesteps a consideration of § 319 in its analysis. See Lake, supra note 6,
at 130. That Tarasoff is unpersuasive under the Restatement (Second) § 319 does
not mean that I regard Tarasoff as an unpersuasive case, as Nasser's characterization of my argument suggests. Nasser, 445 S.E.2d at 506. To the contrary,

Tarasoff is a persuasive development under the Restatement (Second) of Torts and
in the common law of affirmative duties and duty generally.
62

Lake, supra note 6 at 130; Nasser, 445 S.E.2d at 505-06.
Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 339-340.

' Lake, supra note 6, at 130. For purposes of § 319 liability it would appear
that one must actually take charge of a patient-not simply be in a position to do

so if necessary. In addition, any decision not to take charge of a patient would
factor against § 319 liability.
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In addition to the inherent problems under section 319,
Nasser presents a far greater dilemma, both as a Restatement
(Second) of Torts case and as a case that is out of step with
clear trends in common law tort adjudication. Nasser does not
even address obvious problems under Restatement (Second) of
Torts sections 321 and 324A raised by its decision. Both sections (also in Topic 7 of that Restatement) have prima facie
applicability in Nasser, yet the court disregards them entirely
for no apparent reason other than the hyper-technical reason
that demurrer was granted under section 319.
Section 321 provides:
(1) If the actor does an act, and subsequently realizes or should
realize that it has created an unreasonable risk of causing physical
harm to another, he is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to
prevent the risk from taking effect (2) The rule stated in Subsection

(1) applies even though at the time of the act the actor has no reason to believe that it will involve such a risk."

That section is so obviously implicated in Nasser that its absence from consideration is baffling. If Dr. Parker did not know
that his act (or the hospital's acts, or both) of voluntarily committing Edwards created an unreasonable risk of harm to
Lemon by providing her falsely with a sense of security, he
should have at least considered the possibility. No one need
suggest that it was wrong to bring Edwards into care: it was
unreasonable to do so in a way that might worsen the position
of Lemon by putting her at risk. The recitation of the facts
suggests this prima facie argument-and leaves only speculation in rebuttal.
Or, consider section 324A, which provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render

services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the
protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the

third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise
reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) he has
undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person,

or (c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the
third person upon the undertaldng.

65RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 321 (1977).
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTS § 324 (1977).

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

1294

(Vol. 61: 1285

Nasser once again presents a prima facie problem under either
section 324A(a) or section 324A(c). One could argue that Dr.
Parker (and/or the hospital) undertook to provide a service to
Edwards that should have been recognized as necessary for the
protection of Lemon and that under section 324(a), his failure
to warn her of Edwards's departure from the hospital unreasonably increased the risk that she would suffer physical harm
and/or under 324(c), Lemon suffered physical harm because of
her reliance upon Dr. Parker's undertaking to care for Edwards and upon her belief that it was safe to return home
because of that undertaking.
Illustration 5 to section 324A (c) is significantly similar to
the facts of Nasser:
A Railroad Company employs B as a watchman at its crossing, to

give warning to the public of approaching trains. B goes to sleep in
his shanty, and fails to warn of the approach of the train. C, an
automobile driver who knows of the usual presence of the watchman, approaches the crossing, and receiving no warning, drives onto
the track and is struck and injured by the train. B is subject to liability to C!"

The watchman who falls asleep at the scene is similar to the
doctor who undertakes to treat but fails to warn of his oncoming patient, while the victim relies upon the protection of the
doctor's undertaking. One might suggest that the watchman
scenario differs from the situation at issue in Nasser in that a
railroad company has undertaken a duty to the public, and
perhaps a psychiatrist does not. However, Illustration 5 shows
that whether or not B watchman has undertaken to perform a
duty owed to (or intended for) third parties, B would become
liable when C driver acts in reliance upon B's undertaking of
performance. B does not have to know of C, or reasonably
anticipate C, or anticipate or know of C's reliance; the fact that
C relies is enough once the undertaking has begun and B
knows or reasonably should know that the undertaking is
necessary to protect some C. Illustration 5 shows that the "as
necessary for the protection" aspect of section 324A has some
flexibility in it. Certainty of injury to a given C or even any C
is not necessary-unreasonable risk is. Any argument that Dr.

61RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 324A, illus. 5 (1977).
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Parker did not or should not have regarded his services to
Edwards "as necessary for the protection of Lemon" faces problems under Illustration 5.
A variety of additional Restatement (Second) of Torts arguments might be made, but one is decisive. If the American
Law Institute were to revisit the topic of affirmative duties, it
would be forced to acknowledge, at the very least, that the
comment to sections 315(a) and (b) of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts is no longer accurate because there is a least one new
section 315(a) special relationship, that between psychotherapist and patient, and/or that the new "section 319A" is to the
effect that a psychotherapist has a duty to warn readily identifiable victims of his patient's violent intentions. Nasser, conversely, relied upon a Restatement of the law dating from the
1960s and ignored what is now the clear majority rule of the
states. The Restatement (Second) of Torts did not adequately
anticipate the rise of Tarasoff rules; formalistic adherence to a
"Restatement" is now a problem and any attempt to reformulate the law under such a heading must recognize that the law
is not static and anticipate expansion, contraction, modification
and refinement in tort doctrines.59
Not only did Nasser overlook the majority rule, it completely failed to address the approach to questions of duty,
affirmative duty, and tort liability ushered in by Tarasoff and
its progeny." The result is that Nasser leaves open a variety
of important questions: Was the Nasser court protecting the
confidentiality of potential client relationships (an odd case to
do so)? Did the Nasser court think that a duty was too great a
burden on those who provide medical services, or too great a
For example, one might raise the specter of a § 314A relationship when the
victim is a family member of the patient. See Hoffman v. Blackmon, 241 F. 2d
752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970), Or a clever twist on § 327 might arise: Nassero
inaction could be seen as negligently interfering with Lemon's self.rescue. It is a
peculiar oversight of § 327 that it does not specifically recognize (although it
should) that one may negligently interfere with anothers attempt at calf-rescue
from physical harm.
I Most courts recognize the limits of the Restatement approaches. See, e.g.,
McCain v. Florida Power, 593 So. 2d 500, 503 (Fla. 1992) (noting that statutes,
books and case law are not required to "catalog and expressly proscribe every
conceivable risk in order for it to give rise to a duty of care'). Jurisprudentially,
the Restatement (Second) of Torts is a fairly static document, and not able to capture the many dynamic aspects of tort law.
' See Lake, supra note 6, at 114 & n.93.
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burden on the psychotherapeutic community? Does the Nasser
1 that
court believe, as does the court in Boynton v. Burglass,"
too little predictive science is available to support a duty for
psychotherapists to warn of their patients' violent intentions?
Did Nasser fault a criminal justice system for failing to protect
Lemon? Did the Nasser court believe that a doctor, in effect,
should not be vicariously liable in tort for intentional murder?
Is there a sense in Nasser that Lemon assumed a risk by going
back home, or even by entering in to such a relationship? Is
Nasser a Palsgraf2 throwback to anti-jury sentiments and to
court imposed rules limiting the scope of duty?
Nasser failed to engage in the type of analysis of questions
of duty, affirmative duty, and liability that most American
jurisdictions accept as the method to determine such matters.' Modern American courts, many following Tarasoff specifically, 4 now state several axioms about duty and tort liability:
(1)
(2)
(3)

analysis of liability begins with duty;
duty is not sacrosanct, but a conclusion;
the determination of duty depends upon a consideration of
policy or other considerations. 6'

Nasser did not even advert to this body of tort law. As a result,
its analysis suffers, and leaves nagging questions as to the real
motivation behind a counter-intuitive approach to such a
pressing social problem. Underneath the formalistic rhetoric of
Nasser lie the considerations upon which it rests. Although we
do not know what those considerations were because the
Nasser court did not share them with us, it is clear that Nasser
valued the right of a psychotherapist to remain deliberately
590 So.2d 446 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 249 N.Y. 511, 164 N.E. 564 (1928).
" See Lake, supra note 6, at 151 & n.352.
See Lake, supra note 6, at 114-15 & n.93.
6' See Lake supra note 6, at 114 and nn. 91 & 93. This approach mirrors
Prosser's preferred approach, and in many instances courts expressly rely upon
Prosser. See Lake, supra note 6, at 114 n.93. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
did not adopt Prosser's vision of the nature and source of duty as such, but American courts have typically looked to Prosser for guidance on basic questions of the
nature and source of duty instead of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. It is time
for the American Law Institute to revisit the question of duty generally, and to
recognize that the formalistic and static jurisprudence that it promotes has not
been favored by American courts with respect to questions of duty.
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indifferent over the safety of a third party.
While Nasser's more general implications are open to debate, its immediate practical consequences are obvious. Although the court encouraged further litigation over how to
distinguish the case by suggesting that it is distinguishable
from Tarasoff, albeit without elaboration, there can be little
doubt that Nasser virtually immunizes psychotherapists from

tort responsibility to specific individuals and to the public
when such psychotherapists fail to use their professional judgment and to warn of imminent danger. That should not be the
rule in Virginia and the Virginia legislature should consider
overruling Nasser by legislation. Such legislation could take a
variety of forms; there are several Tarasoff-like statutory variations that have been adopted around the United States.' At
a minimum, such legislation should impose a duty to warn
upon a psychotherapist who knows or should know under applicable professional standards that a readily identifiable third
person is in danger after a patient communicates "a serious
threat of physical violence" 7 against that third party. Such
legislation should, of course, protect anyone giving such warnings from tort or other liability for disclosing such information.
Nasser represents a step in the wrong direction socially,
doctrinally and jurisprudentially. We can hardly live in our
modern, crowded and violent society when professionals deliberately disregard the opportunity to save a life from a violent
end, and do so when there is no risk or cost to themselves.
When a court turns to formalistic reliance upon the Restatement (Second) of Torts, it should consider the document carefully and as a whole, and not pick and choose convenient rationales while ignoring obviously countervailing rationales that
are contained within topics of that Restatement meant to be
read as a whole. Finally, Nasser's jurisprudence hearkens to
another era when courts were reluctant to offer little more
than rules as their analysis. If a court finds that a woman's
right to physical security in her home, once cherished by the
common law, must yield to the right of a medical professional
to be consciously indifferent to her imminent danger even

' See, e.g., Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302, 309 (Mo. Ct App. 1995) (citing
various states' statutory provisions).
Bradley, 904 S.W.2d at 307.
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when that professional's actions may have contributed significantly to the risk of her harm, that court should provide more
than a partial, flawed and formalistic Restatement (Second) of
Torts justification.

